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COMMENTARY
COMPARATIVE MODELS OF
PRIVATIZATION: A COMMENTARY ON
THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
Benjamin Lubinda Ngenda*
I. INTRODUCTION
Privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa
is'a recent trend. Unlike Latin America, whose privatization
programs date as far back as the 1970s, African countries only
started these programs around 1990. We, however, seem to
experience similar problems and issues to those that arose in
Latin America. Africa is, of course, a vast continent with vary-
ing political, cultural and economic conditions that vary, to a
greater or lesser extent, from region to region. Some differenc-
es result from our colonial legacy and sociopolitical systems
instituted after independence.
Most African states were granted independence in the
1960s. The transfer of political power to the indigenous peoples
without accompanying it with economic clout would have been
unacceptable. Hence, the newly instituted African governments
devised ways for economic empowerment of their citizens. One
such method was for the nationalization or expropriation of
certain privately owned corporations and the creation of state
monopolies.
Unfortunately, most of these SOEs did not perform as well
as expected. Their special monopoly status and preferential
treatment did not act as a catalyst or incentive for efficiency
and higher productivity. On the contrary, they became classic
cases of massive wastage of resources, bloated staff levels and
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tools of political patronage. By the 1980s it became obvious to
all and sundry that African economies could no longer sustain
and defend such economic irresponsibility. Numerous attempts
at reform were made without success. Further investments,
without fundamental structural reform, resulted in additional
losses. Hence, the 1980s were characterized as the lost decade
for Africa. It became apparent that these SOEs could not be
restructured to high productivity and efficiency under the pre-
vailing conditions.
Not surprisingly, the political leadership came under in-
tense local and external pressure to institute fundamental
economic structural adjustment programs to narrow the budget
deficit, halt the decline in standards of living and upgrade
educational and social amenities. Multilateral and funding
agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, as well as donor agencies, were instrumental in
this regard by setting conditionalities to further assistance.
These include implementation of structural adjustment pro-
grams (SAPs) and enhanced structural adjustment programs
(ESAPs) devised as part of economic rescue packages for most
developing countries.
II. MODALITIES
The question that arises is therefore not whether to privat-
ize but how to. The whole process has to be well planned, exe-
cuted and overseen. In view of the fact that in most cases
SOEs comprise about 80% of economic activity, the success of
this process is critical to the well being of the economy. Specific
legislation has had to be enacted to detail the process and give
legal backing to the program.
Privatization can be overseen by different institutions or
officials, such as:
- A council of Cabinet ministers representing ministries
of Industry, Finance, Trade, Agriculture, etc.
- A committee of the legislature appointed from among
members of Parliament.
- A committee comprising high level civil servants or
bureaucrats.
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- A select group of senior SOE management officials
with extensive experience in managing public corpora-
tions.
- An independent body or private persons representing
progressional bodies or interest groups such as the
chambers of commerce, trade unions, bar associations,
and professional accounting bodies.
Some African countries have opted for one or the other of
these forms of oversight. Others have adopted a hybrid by
having people from different categories working together. The
general distrust of politicians, coupled with the need for trans-
parency and fairness has created a credibility gap. Hence,
there is a wide preference for oversight by an independent non-
political body with little or no ties to the establishment.
State divestment of. SOEs through privatization can be
achieved in many ways. These are spelled out in the privatiza-
tion law, where one exists, and include the following:
Trade sales through public bidding or auction are the most
popular method, especially if the SOE is perceived as profitable
and attracts a lot of interest from potential buyers. The whole
corporation is sold lock, stock and barrel to a single buyer.
In view of the need for transparency, negotiated sales
through private treaty are used, but only if the potential buyer
is a share-holder with preemptive rights. Such contractual
rights have to be honored to the extent that government is
legally bound to offer its shares to the other party, before out-
side offers can be entertained. It is not unusual, however, to
negotiate with a minority shareholder to waive some of these
preemptive rights in order to, for instance, enable the govern-
ment to sell some of its shares by public flotation.
Employee share ownership schemes are quite popular but
not practical in all situations, especially if the nature of the
corporation's business requires a majority strategic sharehold-
er. In the latter case, the corporation may not attract an out-
side buyer for fear of insufficient control due to employee inter-
ference. Unlike Eastern Europe, where free vouchers have
been distributed to citizens or employees, African countries are
wary of the voucher system. Provision of credit and payment
by installment terms is however not uncommon.
Public flotation is the most attractive as it ensures trans-
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parency and wide share-ownership. Moreover, it gives an op-
portunity for people with limited financial resources to partici-
pate in the privatization program by buying some shares in the
corporation. Unfortunately, the lack of institutional capacity in
the form of capital markets makes it impracticable to have
public flotations. This is one of the main reasons why most
African countries are in the process of establishing stock ex-
changes to facilitate and regulate public trading in shares and
other securities.
Asset sales or stripping is a method of privatization, espe-
cially if the assets are redundant or surplus to the SOEs re-
quirements. This occurs where the corporation is reducing its
range of activities and concentrating on its core competencies.
The money raised is used to clear some debts and thereby
make the corporation more attractive to potential buyers.
Liquidation is also a form of privatization, though it is
invoked only if the corporation cannot be sold at all.
III. SOCIAL ISSUES
Unemployment is a major social issue that needs to be
addressed. Since most SOEs have bloated labor forces, a lot of
people are likely to be laid off in order to make the company
cost efficient, more productive and competitive. A sizable pro-
portion of this labor force is relatively well trained and com-
paratively young. The SOEs and governments cannot afford to
pay redundancy benefits, let alone re-train and relocate them.
Massive lay-offs make the privatization programs unpopular
and may lead to political disillusionment.
Reducing the labor force also results in narrowing the tax
base at a time when the government is trying to reduce the
budget deficit and revive the economy.
IV. MONOPOLIES AND EFFICIENCY
A number of SOEs are either natural or artificial monopo-
lies. The sale of such corporations is likely to create private
monopolies, with the accompanying risk of uncompetitive and
unfair trade practices. As a result, it is necessary to pass legis-
lation to provide for regulation of monopolies and prohibition of
anti-competitive business conduct.
It is hoped that privatization programs will result in posi-
tive benefits to the economy. Improved productive capacity and
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efficiency are expected to create more employment opportuni-
ties. Increased earning capacity should lead to greater savings
and spending ability for the overall good of the economy. It
remains to be seen whether Africa will survive in this endeav-
or.

